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Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to examine changes in corporate governance
structures around the filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Information was
gathered for companies contained in the sample of the twenty largest Chapter 11
bankruptcies fqr the years 1995-1997.
Data was collected for each company three years prior to filing, the year
the company filed and three years post filing. The board of directors was
classified into inside directors, gray directors and outside directors. Ownership
was studied with regard to total board ownership in the company and the
percentage each member held in comparison with other members. The
members serving on the auditing committee and compensation committee were
also recorded, as well as total committee size.
Once the data was collected, the Wilcoxon Test and the matched pair test
were used to detect significance. These tests both yielded a significant change
for the following: a decrease in size of the audit committee, a decrease in the
number of gray directors, a decrease in total board size, and an increase in the
percentage of ownership per outside director. These restructuring changes
support studies showing that certain characteristics of boards may prove to be
more beneficial for a firm.
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Changes in Corporate Governance Structures Preceding and Following
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy
Introduction
The role of corporate governance has become a major issue in recent
years. This is partially attributed to current events such as the collapse of Enron.
The effects of corporate governance can have a serious impact on the global
economy. Ira M. Millstein, senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, shared
his comments in an interview with Business Week (Garten 2002), "Good
corporate governance protects shareholders' interests and therefore leads to
more investment from the United States and elsewhere into developing
countries." The article further expanded on Millstein's quote, "From Brussels to
Beijing, there is growing awareness that problems relating to auditing,
transparency, and boards of directors need serious attention. It's an important
moment. Regulators and CEO's should take advantage of it." The article
discussed the importance of future legislation as well, "The SEC should establish
national standards relating to the qualifications and responsibilities of boards of
directors by refining the definition of what constitutes an independent director and
specifying the duties of the audit and compensation committees."
The purpose of this study is to examine changes in board composition, the
auditing committee, the compensation committee, and equity ownerships of
board members around the filing of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.
Information was gathered for companies contained in the sample of the twenty
largest Chapter 11 bankruptcies for the years 1995, 1996 and 1997. The
beginning sample of sixty companies was narrowed down to eleven due to the
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to file for Chapter 11. There are minor exclusions to this rule including insurance
and banking institutions, stockbrokers and commodity brokers.
The filing of Chapter 11 may be voluntarily or involuntarily. A voluntary
filing initiated by the debtor begins by filing with the bankruptcy court and
constitutes the entry of an "order for relief." For an individual or sole
proprietorship, no evidence of authorization to file is necessary other than the
declaration of an affidavit that is attached to the petition. In a partnership, all
general partners must agree to the petition and may be filed on behalf of the
partnership by one or more of the"general partners. If all general partners do not
agree to the petition, the filing is treated as involuntary. Evidence of a
declaration by the board of directors authorizing the filing of a petition is generally
filed with the petition for a corporation, although it is not always required.
Unlike a voluntary petition, an involuntary petition does not constitute an
order for relief. The debtor is given time to challenge the petition. An
"involuntary gap" period takes place where the debtor continues to operate its
business and may sell off property unless otherwise ordered by the court. An
involuntary petition may be filed against any entity that is eligible for a voluntary
Chapter 11 petition, excluding a farmer, family farmer or not-for-profit
corporation. For an involuntary petition to take place, there must be at least
three petitioning creditors when there are twelve or more holders of claims
against the debtor. On the other hand, there only needs to be one petitioning
creditor if there are fewer than twelve holders of claims against the debtor. The
petitioner must have secured claims of at least $5,000, and declare that the
7
Certain circumstances require the appointment of a trustee. If these
circumstances do not exist, the management of the debtor retains control, and is
expected to continue normal business activities. The current management team,
termed debtor-in-possession, is left in place since they are the most familiar with
business activities, therefore maximizing potential for a successful
reorganization. The debtor in possession has the following rights: operate its
business, receive the benefits of the automatic stay, enter into transactions
including the sale or lease of its property, obtain unsecured credit and incur
unsecured debt, begin or prosecute actions to recover property or avoid liens on
property, and receive the benefits of the extension of time of various periods of
limitation.
If the appointment of a trustee would be in the best interests of creditors,
current management may be ousted. A trustee is appointed after notice and a
hearing if fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the
business is or has been displayed by current management. The only other case
that requires the appointment of a trustee is if such an appointment is in the
interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the
estate. The United States trustee selects a trustee after the court orders the
appointment. There has been a more recent trend towards the appointment of a
trustee due to lack of confidence by creditors in the current management.
Under state law, shareholders possess the right to an annual meeting
where the election of directors takes place. However, provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code dealing with management of the debtor-in-possession do not
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bankruptcy process, firms will reduce the size of their board of directors in order
to increase effectiveness.
Another study done by Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), examined the
presence of outsiders on the board of directors. The results were consistent with
the idea that outside directors better serve the interests of shareholders. This
can be partially attributed to reputation concerns and fear of lawsuits by
shareholders. Considering the bankruptcy process can cause several problems
between management and shareholders, one can conclude that the presence of
outsiders on the board of directors will most likely increase prior to and following
filing Chapter 11. However, if there is an increase in the percentage of outsiders,
there must be a drop in either gray directors or insiders to compensate for the
difference. The entire make-up of the board preceding and following filing will be
studied for this reason.
A recent article appearing in CFO magazine discussed the implications of
the accounting problems facing Enron. One of the difficulties foreseen is
convincing qualified executives to accept audit committee nominations, says Bob
Williamson, CFO of investment bank vFinance Inc., and a former audit committee
member and CFO of Equinox Systems Inc. For these reasons, predictions
regarding the size of the audit committee during bankruptcy proceedings show a
decrease in size. Information on the compensation committee will also be
collected in order to see if this prediction holds true for committees in general, or
if the information is specific to the audit committee.
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representatives, independent investors, or other independent directors. The
number of shares outstanding will be collected in order to determine ownership in
the company for each board member. Ownership is studied with regard to total
board ownership in the company and the percentage each member held in
comparison with other members to determine control of the board. The members
serving on the auditing committee and compensation committee will also be
recorded, as well as total committee size.
Once the data is collected, both parametric and non-parametric tests will
be used to test for significance. The Wilcoxon Test will be used as the non-
parametric test. This requires the data to be ranked according to the absolute
value of the magnitude between the data pairs. Once the ranks are calculated,
each rank assumes a sign (+ or -) depending on the original magnitude
difference. By using this procedure, more weight is given to a pair showing a
large difference than a small difference. The sum of the positive and negative
ranks are calculated to find T, which is equal to the absolute value of the lesser
value between T+ and T-. T is then compared to the critical value for the sample
size to see if significance exists, or if the data is merely due to chance.
A matched paired test is used to test for differences between the means.
The standard deviation of the differences is calculated and divided by the square
root of the sample size. The average of the differences is then divided by the
standard deviation of the average differences to find a T value, which is
.
compared with the critical value to test for significance.
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outsiders on the board, parametric tests showed marginal significance for an
increase in percentage. This partially supports our hypothesis based on the
study done by Brickley, Coles and Terrry (1994) that outside directors are more
independent monitors. In summary, the percentage of gray directors serving on
the board decreases after bankruptcy, while the percentage of outsiders on the
board of directors increases after bankruptcy. One possible explanation is that it
is hard to remove insiders, considering the power they possess over the board.
Often, the chairman of the board is also the chief executive officer. In fact, in
November of 2001, of the 30 companies listed on the Dow Jones, 23 companies
had a CEO who was also serving as Chairman of the Board. However, during
the bankruptcy process, investors prefer outside leadership since it was the
current management that brought the company into bankruptcy in the first place.
Also, as discussed previously, outsiders serve in the interests of shareholders.
Therefore, the shareholders replace gray directors with outside directors.
Although the percentage of insiders on the board is relatively stable, the
percentage of ownership by insider directors decreases by almost 20%. The
percentage of gray ownership is almost exactly equal for the years t = -3 and t =
3, even though there is a decrease in the number of gray directors serving on the
board. The decline in ownership by the insiders is made up for by the 20%
increase in ownership by outsiders for the six-year period. Although it may seem
as if insiders are selling off part of their stake in the company, this is not the case
considering the 41% of ownership per inside director stays the same. Therefore,
the board size must increase or decrease in size to make up for this change.
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direction the company is headed. These members are not replaced until the
following annual meeting and may never be replaced.
By studying the board of directors as a whole, the data shows that board
size significantly decreases. The data is consistent with the Yermack (1996)
study conducted on board size discussed previously. On average, the board size
decreases from 9.36 at t = -3 to 6.73 at t = 3. Board size decreases in seven out
of the eleven companies analyzed throughout the bankruptcy process. Lomas
Financial, for instance, had a board size of seventeen prior to filing Chapter 11,
yet the board had shrunk to five members three years following the filing. The
hypothesis that smaller boards are more effective has consistently been
supported, which explains why board size may decrease throughout the
bankruptcy process. Board composition can be further broken down into
insiders, outsiders and gray directors. Statistical tests did not yield a significant
change for the number of insiders or outsiders serving on the board. However,
parametric and non-parametric tests yielded a significant decrease in the number
of gray directors. As discussed previously, this may be attributed to the disposal
of gray directors by inside directors. By engaging in this process, there is more
room for outsiders, which would send a positive signal to shareholders.
Conclusion
This paper documents changes in corporate governance including board
structure, ownership and committee structure before and after bankruptcy. I
report statistically significant changes in the size of the audit committee, number
of gray directors serving on the board, total board size, and percentage of
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Statistical Summary of Results
The sample includes companies that were listed in the twenty largest Chapter 11 bankruptcies for
the years 1995, 1996 and 1997 and filed proxy statements for the time periods t = -3, t t = 0 and t
= 3. Standard deviations for each category are shown in parentheses.
Panel A: Board Structure Mean
-3 3
% Insiders 24.37 25.56
(9.33) (11.47)
% Gray 36.63 24.28
(19.73) (18.21)
% Outsiders 39.00 50.26
(20.92) (24.55)
# Insiders 2.18 1.73
(0.87) (0.90)
# Gray 3.36 1.55
(2.34) (1.29)
# Outsiders 3.82 3.45
(3.22) (2.21)
Total Board Size 9.36 6.73
(3.59) (1.95)
Panel B: Ownership Mean
-3 3
% Inside Ownership 78.83 59.31
(27.92) (32.22)
% Gray Ownership 15.34 15.42
(28.70) (27.10)
% Outside Ownership 5.82 25.27
(6.87) (31.18)
% Inside Ownership/Director 41.99 40.09
(29.93) (25.88)
% Gray Ownership/Director 3.87 7.49
(5.21) (13.61)
% Outside Ownership/Director 1.38 6.40
(1.89) (7.84)
% Shares Owned by Board 11.23 18.72
(18.16) (18.09)
% Shares: Officers & Directors 13.70 21.19
(18.49) (19.04)
Panel C: Committees Mean
-3 3
# Audit Committee 3.73 3.18
(0.90) (0.87)
# Compensation Committee 3.18 2.73
(1.33) (1.42)
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Median
-3 3
25.00 22.22
33.33 28.57
40.00 50.00
2.00 1.00
2.00 2.00
2.00 3.00
10.00 7.00
Median
-3 3
84.24 55.46
3.90 1.56
2.73 13.56
32.03 33.14
0.89 0.39
0.91 1.92
4.85 16.48
7.32 16.44
Median
-3 3
3.00 3.00
3.00 3.00
